
Every four years, a soccer tournament arrives in the way a rich uncle arrives at a wedding: loud, briefly generous, and gone before anyone has to discuss the bill. This summer the uncle came to North America, and Fox Corporation billed him for everything.
The numbers are genuinely enormous, so let us enjoy them before we ruin them. Fiscal fourth quarter revenue was $4.21 billion, up 28%, which is not a beat so much as an ambush. Analysts were penciling in something closer to $3.64 billion. Advertising revenue jumped 78% to $1.92 billion. Adjusted EBITDA rose 27% to $1.20 billion. Full year revenue came in at $17.13 billion, up 5%, with EPS of $3.84.
Lachlan Murdoch called fiscal 2026 exceptional. He is not wrong. He is just describing weather, not climate.
The correction nobody makes because it's inconvenient
Here is where most coverage this week got sloppy, including a first draft of this one.
Fox's television segment did not generate $1.5 billion in advertising growth. It generated roughly $1.46 billion in total segment advertising revenue, of which the increase was $755 million, or 108% year over year. That segment includes the Fox broadcast network, the television stations, and Tubi. It does not include Fox News, which lives in cable.
The difference between "made $1.5 billion" and "grew by $1.5 billion" is the difference between a business and a fantasy, and it is the exact species of error that ends up in a deck someone uses to justify a 2027 upfront commitment. Doubling your advertising line in a World Cup quarter is spectacular. It is also arithmetic that only works when there is a World Cup.
The cable segment, where the fun costs money
Cable network programming revenue rose 9% to $1.67 billion. Advertising was up 22%, roughly $83 million to about $460 million, courtesy of World Cup spillover onto FS1 and FS2. Distribution rose 7%, about $76 million, which for a cable bundle in 2026 counts as a small miracle.
And yet: segment EBITDA fell 3%.
Read that again, because it is the only paragraph in Fox's release that tells the truth about sports economics. You can grow revenue 9% and still make less money, because rights amortization and production costs do not care about your narrative. The World Cup was not free. Fox rented the most valuable inventory in television and paid retail for it.
Tubi is the part that actually compounds
Strip out the tournament and Tubi is the only line in this report that looks like a durable business.
110 million monthly active users, up 14%
Revenue up 35%, the biggest revenue quarter in its history
Total viewing time up 17%
More than 20 million visitors to its World Cup hub
Nearly 60% of the audience is Gen Z or millennial
That last number is the one media buyers should tattoo somewhere visible. Fox spent fifteen years being a company that sold access to people who still have opinions about cable news, and it quietly built the free streaming service where the young people went. Tubi is Fox's actual growth story, and the World Cup was its largest customer acquisition event ever.
One caveat that got mangled in the wire copy: the "one third of viewing was mobile" figure applies specifically to Tubi's simulcasts of the two opening matches, not to all World Cup viewing everywhere. Small distinction. Enormous difference if you are building a 2027 media plan on it.
Now the $22 billion question, which is Roku
Fox is buying Roku for $160 per share, roughly $22 billion in enterprise value, funded with cash, stock, and $12 billion of committed bridge financing from Morgan Stanley. At close, Fox holders own about 73%, Roku holders about 27%, pro forma net leverage lands near 2.8x, and Roku founder Anthony Wood joins the Fox board.
Fox projects roughly $400 million in run rate cost synergies. That is a management estimate, not a result, and every executive who has ever announced a synergy number has believed it at the time.
On timing, be precise: Fox and Roku are targeting a close in the first half of calendar 2027, subject to shareholder and U.S. and non-U.S. regulatory approvals. That maps to Fox's fiscal third or fourth quarter, assuming the June 30 year end holds. Anyone writing "on track" is doing public relations. "Targeting, subject to approvals" is the disclosed record.
Roku, for its part, showed up to the engagement party looking great: Q2 revenue of $1.35 billion, up 22%; platform revenue $1.22 billion, up 25%; net income of $164 million against $10.5 million a year ago. Roku declined to hold an earnings call or issue guidance, citing the pending deal, which is the corporate equivalent of leaving the room while your parents discuss the dowry.
One asterisk that deserves more attention than it got: that record net income was flattered by a tariff refund on device duties. Back it out and net income was closer to $127 million and devices gross margin goes negative. Still an excellent quarter. Just not a 15x miracle, whatever the aggregators told you.
The tension is the story
Fox and Roku have publicly committed to keeping Roku an open, partner friendly platform. That is an announced commitment, not an inference and not a wink. Take it seriously.
Also take seriously that Fox will own the home screen where Tubi, Fox One, and every competitor compete for the same pixels. Roku's value to Netflix and Disney depends on neutrality. Fox's value from Roku depends on discovery, retention, and advertising lift for Fox products. Those two things are not the same thing, and the entire integration risk of this deal sits in the gap between them.
For advertisers, that gap is the whole ballgame. Roku brings a direct relationship with more than 100 million streaming households and the first party data that goes with it. Bolt that onto Fox's live sports and news inventory and you get a genuinely formidable seller. You also get one more walled measurement environment run by a company with a strong incentive to grade its own homework. If you buy CTV, start asking now what independent verification looks like inside a combined Fox and Roku, because the answer will be much harder to negotiate in 2028 than it is in 2026.
What fiscal 2027 actually looks like
No World Cup. No quadrennial inventory scarcity. No hydration break commercial windows that exist because FIFA scheduled matches in North American summer heat.
What Fox does have: midterm political advertising, which lands squarely in fiscal 2027 and which local broadcast still monetizes better than anyone; a full year of FOX One instead of launch costs; Tubi compounding at 35%; and an $8 billion pile of new debt with an integration attached.
The honest run rate is the full year number, not the quarter: advertising up 7%, revenue up 5%. That is a healthy, well managed legacy media company with one real growth engine and one very large bet. The 28% is a souvenir.
So the question for the post tournament period is not whether Fox can replicate the World Cup. Nobody can replicate the World Cup. The question is whether Fox can convert a summer of borrowed attention into permanent Tubi and FOX One habit, while carrying the debt, the regulators, and a platform neutrality promise it made in public and will be held to in private.
Ask again in eighteen months, when the uncle has gone home and the bar tab is due.
How we reported this: Figures come from Fox Corporation's fiscal Q4 and full year 2026 earnings release and 10-K summary, the Fox earnings call, Roku's Q2 2026 shareholder letter and 8-K, Fox's June 2026 acquisition announcement, and trade coverage from Variety, The Hollywood Reporter, CNBC, and TVNewsCheck. Every revenue, segment, and deal number was checked against filings or company statements rather than aggregator headlines, and where the two diverged the filing wins. The period covered is Fox's fiscal Q4 and fiscal year ended June 30, 2026, Roku's fiscal Q2 ended the same day, and deal terms as announced in June 2026. Limitations: the $400 million synergy figure and the first half 2027 close are forward looking management projections, not results; segment level dollar changes are Fox's own disclosure, rounded; Roku's normalized net income excluding the tariff refund uses the company's stated adjustment. An earlier draft of this analysis described television segment advertising growth as $1.5 billion, which is wrong. The correct figure is roughly $1.46 billion in segment advertising revenue, an increase of $755 million.
Disclosures
No financial relationship with Fox, Roku, or Tubi. Not sponsored. No advance review. Fox and Roku were contacted for comment. ADOTAT takes no paid placement in editorial and is funded by readers.


