Before we get into the current mess, you need to understand how we got here.

In 1923, a guy named Arthur Nielsen started a company that measured retail sales. By 1950, he'd figured out that measuring radio audiences was more interesting and more lucrative. The Nielsen Audimeter, a device that recorded what station a radio was tuned to, became the foundation of an empire that would hold the entire television industry by the throat for the better part of a century.

Television came along. Nielsen adapted. The company installed meters on TVs, recruited panels of households, and created the ratings system that would determine which shows lived and which shows died. For decades, this was fine. Three networks, one measurement company, everybody knew the rules.

Then cable happened. Suddenly there were dozens of channels. Nielsen adapted again. Bigger panels, more meters, more data.

Then streaming happened. And DVRs. And smart TVs. And Roku and Fire TV and Apple TV and phones and tablets and gaming consoles. People started watching TV on devices that didn't look like TVs, in ways that didn't look like watching. And Nielsen's panel, a few tens of thousands of households with meters, was designed for a world that simply doesn't exist anymore.

In 2021, the MRC (the Media Rating Council, the industry's accreditation body) suspended Nielsen's national TV accreditation. The immediate cause was COVID: Nielsen's panel maintenance had been disrupted, and they were undercounting out-of-home viewing. But the deeper issue was that their methodology was showing its age. And by "showing its age" I mean it was wheezing up the stairs like a pack-a-day smoker.

The trade press declared Nielsen dead. The challengers, VideoAmp, Comscore, iSpot, were coming. The multi-currency future was inevitable.

That was the narrative. Here's what actually happened.

A few weeks before VideoAmp quietly showed her the door, their CMO Jenny Wall was on a podcast painting a rosy picture. The company was "almost 100%" transitioned to pure measurement, she said. They had deals with "every single publisher but one" and "every single holding company." Multi-year agreements with Paramount, Netflix, Amazon, NBCU. David was about to slay Goliath.

Then, a few months later, Peter Liguori, VideoAmp's Executive Chairman turned CEO, stood on stage at the CIMM Summit and told the audience: "You all spend $4 billion roughly on measurement services... and for VideoAmp, we represent less than 1% of that TAM, so we're probably doing something wrong."

Less than 1%. After a decade. After $600 million in funding. After all those upfront presentations about the multi-currency future. That's the kind of honesty that usually gets you fired. And, well.

Jenny Wall was gone within months. Position not being refilled. Peter stepped down as CEO shortly after. Tony Fagan is their third CEO in two years. If your company is cycling through leaders faster than most people change their Netflix passwords, you might have a problem.

So that's the implosion narrative. Here's what complicates it:

VideoAmp is doing over $150 million a year in currency revenue on the advanced/streaming side. Revenue that was literally zero in 2020. They claim they have "90% of the future" in digital, streaming, outcomes, and cross-platform measurement beyond traditional 18-49 demos. That currency business went from nothing to $150 million in about three and a half years.

The bad news? That future is still only 10-15% of the total market. Traditional demos remain the bigger piece. They spent a few years fighting for that traditional side and "it hasn't really moved the needle much."

So which is it: implosion or strategic pivot? Both numbers are true. Less than 1% of traditional TAM. $150 million in new advanced currency revenue. The question is which number matters more, and the answer depends on whether you think the traditional TV currency fight was ever winnable for anyone not named Nielsen.

I've got the insider account of what the Peter/Jenny era was actually about, why they left, what the pivot to Tony Fagan really means, and whether the debt load makes any of it sustainable. That's in Part 4, for paid subscribers.

While the trade press was writing Nielsen's obituary, something interesting happened: Nielsen fixed their problems.

Big Data + Panel is now MRC accredited. The first hybrid panel/big-data product with person-level estimates to get that stamp. They're processing over 100 terabytes of data daily. 45 million households, 75 million devices, 42,000+ panel homes with 100,000+ people.

Every major sports league signed. Every agency holding company signed. Paramount renewed after publicly flirting with alternatives. Warner Bros. renewed without drama. The NFL praised Big Data + Panel after a brief summer spat that turned out to be a "roadmap timing disagreement." Translation: they got over it.

Their Chief Product Officer Akhil Parekh said just recently that 2026 is "the tipping point where creators will be treated as media companies" demanding "consistent, independent measurement." They're expanding into creator measurement, podcasting, outcomes.

They're not dying. They're evolving. And their infrastructure moat, the planning tools, the agency integrations, the historical baselines, is deeper than anyone wanted to admit. Turns out when you've been the default for 70 years, that counts for something. Who knew.

But before you crown them: last June, 26 top sell-side executives sat across from Nielsen leadership to confront them on BD+P issues. Words like "inexplicable," "unacceptable," and "unexplained" were thrown around. The VAB published research calling BD+P "unstable, unpredictable and decimating demographics." Nielsen fired back calling it "seriously flawed and manipulated."

Then Nielsen's specific rebuttals turned out to be, apparently, wrong.

That fight is ugly. The methodology questions are real. And the uncomfortable truth is that most of those frustrated executives renewed their Nielsen contracts anyway. Infrastructure lock-in is a hell of a drug.

The full VAB fight, what Nielsen got wrong in their rebuttal, and what it means for anyone transacting on BD+P is in Part 3.

Now let's talk about iSpot, because what's happening there is worse than you think and nobody in the trade press seems to care.

On paper, it's fine. iSpot got embedded in The Trade Desk as default incrementality measurement. They won an $18.3 million lawsuit against EDO. They co-published research with GroupM on CTV waste. Real accomplishments.

But still no MRC accreditation. Their Super Bowl numbers have consistently diverged from Nielsen's by millions of viewers, and nobody can explain why. And their Glassdoor reviews include gems like "CEO refuses to admit he's unable to lead" and one comparing leadership to "The Devil Wears Prada multiplied by 10."

You can't make this stuff up. Actually you can, but you don't need to.

Now here's the scoop: iSpot has been quietly bleeding out.

Sources tell us there have been a series of unreported layoffs, the latest round just last week.

According to multiple senior-level industry sources with direct knowledge of the situation, iSpot has cut nearly 100 employees in the last three months. Based on publicly available information, including what CEO Sean Muller stated under oath in court, iSpot had roughly 400 employees prior to these cuts.

That's a quarter of the company. Gone. With zero coverage.

Both VideoAmp and iSpot raised at huge growth-stage valuations to chase Nielsen's audience currency business. Both failed to displace Nielsen. But where VideoAmp made friends with agencies and built tools people actually wanted to use, iSpot went to war with everyone. The agencies. The publishers. Competitors. And that strategy has, by every account we've heard, really failed.

Now they're layering AI tools on top of their original product and calling it a transformation. Which, sure. OK.

The full picture on iSpot's debt load, the structural economics of why challenging Nielsen on currency is so punishing, and what "permanent private equity mode" looks like is in Part 4.

Comscore stopped trying to be Nielsen. Smart move. They found their lane: local TV dominance, cross-platform, clean business model. Their CMO Jacqueline Keller calls them "a unicorn... one of the only companies that don't have an ad business." No drama. No CEO carousel. Steady, boring progress. In this industry, boring is a superpower. And they're probably the most underrated company in measurement right now. Part 2 has their methodology breakdown.

EDO said screw audience measurement entirely and built outcomes measurement instead, partnering with Disney, Netflix, Amazon, Nielsen, NBCU simultaneously. Just launched ChatEDO, an AI interface for outcomes queries. Also just lost that $18.3 million lawsuit to iSpot for allegedly scraping data. They're appealing. Bold strategy: measure outcomes while your legal outcomes are pending.

TVision filed antitrust counterclaims alleging Nielsen uses "sham lawsuits" to drain competitor resources. Nielsen has sued them five times since 2021. Won zero. At some point you have to ask if the legal department is a cost center or a hobby.

HyphaMetrics won their Nielsen lawsuit by essentially arguing they don't have a product that could infringe. Their panel is reportedly around 50 households. That's not a panel, that's a dinner party. They've announced partnerships with Samba TV, VideoAmp, Comscore, TiVo. Impressive press releases. Unclear if meaningful revenue is flowing. An NBCU director asked me point blank why they exist. I've invited their founder to answer that question for this series. They keep pushing it off. The silence is louder than the press releases.

Here's something that should terrify anyone buying connected TV:

Research shows roughly 10% of CTV impressions are delivered to devices that are turned off.

One in ten. Billions of dollars. Served to black screens.

Nielsen's panel catches this because actual humans are pushing buttons. Pure big data approaches? They count the impression and move on. Nobody's home, but the meter's running.

Most alternative providers don't offer local TV measurement. CTV audience identification is a mess because knowing a TV is on doesn't tell you who's watching. And the platforms are simultaneously selling inventory AND reporting on performance. Student grading their own test. What could go wrong.

This is TV measurement in 2026. Currencies that don't agree. Data that might be 10-50% wrong. CTV impressions going to turned-off screens. And an industry that would rather fight about who counts better than admit nobody's solved the problem.

Which methodologies actually catch the waste, and which ones are counting black screens as impressions? That's Part 2.

This free piece is the overview. Here's what's behind the paywall:

Part 2: "Why Methodology Matters More Than Marketing" - What Nielsen's Big Data + Panel actually does vs. Comscore's personification vs. VideoAmp's approach. Why pure big data fails without panel calibration. The turned-off TV problem in detail. The VAB's five layered biases claim. Which vendors can actually answer the questions CFOs ask. This is the piece to send your measurement team.

Part 3: "Why Everyone Re-Signs With Nielsen" - The pattern nobody discusses. Infrastructure moats. Planning tool lock-in. The TVision antitrust filing and what it alleges about Nielsen's contract practices. Why 26 executives confronted Nielsen in June and then most of them renewed anyway. This is the piece to read before your next vendor negotiation.

Part 4: "Comscore's Discipline and the Outcomes Escape Hatch" - How Comscore stopped trying to dethrone Nielsen and found a winning strategy. EDO's completely different approach to the measurement problem. Why VideoAmp's pivot to outcomes and AI might actually make sense. Why outcomes measurement might be where this all lands. This is the piece for anyone tired of the audience measurement wars.

Part 5: "Three Futures" - Nielsen dominance continues (70% probability). True multi-currency emerges (20%). Platform takeover by Amazon/Google/Roku (10%). Who wins each scenario. A vendor evaluation framework with 10 questions. The questions your CFO should be asking. This is the piece that ties it all together.

I've spent weeks on this. Nielsen gave me extensive background and on-record quotes. Comscore provided methodology details most buyers never see. VAB finally explained the real fight behind the press releases. VideoAmp insiders shared what actually happened. I've reviewed court filings, Glassdoor reviews, podcast transcripts, earnings calls, and had dozens of off-record conversations.

The cost of getting measurement wrong is real money. Career-level money. The series is $19, or $49 gets you a full year of access.

If you're a buyer, you're making decisions on data that might be 10-50% wrong depending on who's measuring.

If you're a CFO, you're guaranteeing on currencies that don't agree with each other - and you'll have to explain the discrepancy when the post-campaign analysis lands.

If you're a publisher, your inventory is valued on ratings that might systematically miscount your audience - and according to VAB, that miscount skews against the 25-54 demo you're trying to sell.

If you're an investor, you're betting on companies with wildly different leadership stability, legal exposure, and business model clarity.

The measurement wars aren't Nielsen vs. the challengers. They're about an industry that still can't agree on how to count - and what happens to the billions of dollars caught in between.

Jenny Wall said VideoAmp had deals with everyone. Peter Liguori said they were doing something wrong. Insiders say the whole engagement was always temporary. Maybe they're all telling the truth.

That's the measurement industry in 2026.